In The Name Of Nationalism

K.N.Panikker
A new identity is being foisted on Hindus. The identity of Hindutva. Are Hindus being coerced to accept that identity, socially and culturally and indeed politically? Apparently, no society can be forced to own an externally induced identity. It has to emerge from within as a part of social dynamics. Yet, when ideas are implanted in social consciousness and nurtured through legitimising interventions, they do succeed in exercising a powerful influence in society. Hindutva is such an idea `invented' about 80 years ago, intellectually elaborated thereafter by several communal ideologues and recently given wide currency through state sponsorship, political support and socio-cultural mobilisation. Although alien to Hindu philosophical tenets and religious practices, Hindutva has gained legitimacy as a commonly shared heritage among a large section of Hindus. The implications of this development has pitch-forked Hindutva to the centre stage of contemporary Indian politics.
Hindutva and Hinduism
But then what is Hindutva? None of its contemporary advocates, including former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and his less imaginative colleagues in the Sangh Parivar, have spelt out its character and its constitutive elements. For good reasons. They are seeking to evolve an overarching political ideology to bring together the followers of a highly differentiated religious faith. Hindutva is, therefore, conceived as an undefinable quality inherent in the Hindu `race', which cannot be identified with anything specific in Hinduism. Hindutva, in the opinion of Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, the progenitor of the concept, "is so varied and so rich, so powerful and so subtle, so elusive and yet so vivid" that it defies all attempts at analysis. Therefore, he had stopped short of defining it; instead he only tried to underline its relationship with Hinduism. He had asserted: "Hinduism is only a derivative, a fraction, a part of Hindutva." He, however, argued that this distinction would help to consolidate the Hindu community: "Failure to distinguish between Hindutva and Hinduism has given rise to much misunderstanding and mutual suspicion between some of those sister communities that have inherited this inestimable and common treasure of our Hindu civilisation... It is enough to point out that Hindutva is not identical with what is vaguely indicated by the term Hinduism. By an `ism' it is generally meant a theory or a code more or less based on spiritual or religious dogma or system. But when we attempt to investigate into the essential significance of Hindutva, we do not primarily - and certainly not mainly - concern ourselves with any particular theocratic or religious dogma or creed... Hindutva embraces all the departments of thought and activity of the whole Being of our Hindu race." Despite the above distinction, the relationship between Hindutva and Hinduism is well marked even in Savarkar's scheme. Savarkar had argued that a Muslim or a Christian, even if born in India, could not claim to possess the qualities of Hindutva. The essentials of Hindutva, according to Savarkar, are "a common nation (rashtra), a common race (jati) and a common civilisation (sanskriti)".
Later Hindu ideologues such as M.S. Golwalkar elaborated this idea to exclude all non-Hindus from the ambit of the nation. Hindutva, therefore, serves as an ideological justification for the construction of India as a Hindu nation. The statement of the Prime Minister that the demolition of the Babri Masjid is an expression of national sentiment and his reluctance to condemn the Gujarat massacre unambiguously demonstrate his commitment to the political ideology of Hindutva. So does the Sangh Parivar's general view that the rath yatra of L.K. Advani, currently enacting a repeat performance, represents the resurgence of India as a nation. In the Hindu communal practice, therefore, the distinction between Hindutva and Hinduism has disappeared, which has helped the militant communal Hindu politics to command the support of unsuspecting Hindu believers. In the last few elections, this strategy has returned high dividends.
The next election is another test case as to whether Hindus can be coerced in the name of their faith to act against the basic tenets of their own religion. Despite the new slogans of development and statesmanship, Hindutva would continue to be an issue in the forthcoming elections. For the Sangh Parivar cannot ensure the support even of its ardent followers without feeding them with irrational politics. Such politics commands wider support when imbued with cultural content. The Sangh Parivar is fully alive to this mobilising potential of culture, which accounts for the foregrounding of cultural nationalism as central to its politics.
Cultural nationalism
The concept of cultural nationalism conceived and propagated by Hindutva is based on a misrepresentation of the nature of national identity. Nationalism, like democracy, is indivisible, with its constitutive elements - political, economic and cultural - intermeshed with each other. Privileging any one of these attributes tends to undermine the holistic character of nationalism. There is no denying the importance of culture in the make-up of national identity; yet culture alone does not mould the nationalism of any country. This was true of India as well where nationalism emerged and evolved as a part of anti-colonial consciousness. Culture was deeply implicated in this process of national reconstruction, both by trying to develop a national culture, which was distinct from the colonial and the traditional, as well as by invoking culture as a locus of resistance. Yet, the struggle for national culture during the anti-colonial period either remained an epi-phenomenon, or an instrument of political mobilisation. Therefore, the cultural question was not adequately addressed during the anti-colonial struggle and Hindutva has appropriated the space thus left open.
Hindutva's conception of nationalism is rooted in the primacy of culture over politics. The meaning attributed to culture by the ideologues of the Sangh Parivar and their cultural practices further qualifies the character of cultural nationalism. According to their interpretation, culture "is but a product of our all-comprehensive religion, a part of its body and not distinguishable from it". It naturally implies that the national culture is Hindu religious culture. Cultural nationalism is, therefore, a euphemism invoked in order to mask the creation of a state with Hindu religious identity. Such a character of the nation was clearly spelt out by Golwalkar: "In Hindustan, the land of the Hindus lives and should live the Hindu Nation... Consequently, only those movements are truly `National' as aim at rebuilding, revitalising, and emancipating from the present stupor, the Hindu Nation."
The contemporary advocates of cultural nationalism and the movements they lead are engaged in creating a nation in which the Hindu religious identity coincides with the cultural. This is attempted through intervention in culture rather than cultural intervention. The importance of this distinction is realised by the activists of the Hindutva who, as a result, constantly intervene in the actual cultural life of the people in order to transform it in a religious direction. As a part of this endeavour, the Sangh Parivar has set up cultural organisations in almost every conceivable area. They are constantly engaged in imparting a Hindu religious character to the quotidian cultural practices of the people. The secular forces, on the other hand, even at the face of the successful cultural advance of Hindutva, continue to be trapped in an instrumentalist view of culture and persist with their faith in the transformative power of cultural performance.
The multi-faceted cultural intervention of Hindutva is primarily intended to appropriate the cultural past as Hindu and to expropriate the `other' as anti-national. As a part of the former, a new Hindu cultural pantheon is being constructed. The icons of this pantheon goes back to the Indus Valley Civilisation, renamed now as Saraswati River civilisation, as a part of the attempt to impart to it a Hindu character. At any rate, the lineage of the Hindu nation is traced to the culture of the Vedic era and, though not yet firmly, to the Indus Valley. Identifying the roots of the Indian civilisational process to the achievements of the Harappan and the Vedic people is indeed unexceptionable. That, however, does not establish either its contemporary relevance or its being the sole source of national culture, as Hindutva seems to advocate. In doing so, the historical process, which has ushered in a fundamental transformation in social and cultural mores, is ignored. Nevertheless, it has admirably served its ends. It has given to the Hindu, culturally and psychologically ravaged by colonial subjugation, the knowledge of a credible and honourable cultural past. In the process, Hindutva has not only succeeded in creating a new, even aggressive, cultural confidence among Hindus, but at the same time cast itself as the defender and preserver of Indian heritage. Thereby Hindutva claims to represent the cultural interest of the Hindu `community' as a whole.
The success of Hindutva was its ability to implant its Hindu representative character in social consciousness. Through a series of social and cultural undertakings, initially at the grassroots level, such an impression was slowly but surely created. An interesting example is the movement for the renovation of village temples, which were in decay. The members of the Sangh Parivar positioning themselves in the forefront of this movement received the general approval and approbation of the Hindus of the locality. It was believed that they were acting not only to maintain a religious place of worship but also to preserve the cultural tradition. At a national plane, the Ram Janmabhoomi issue provided an unprecedented opportunity, which was used by celebrating Ram as a national icon and by undertaking the popularisation of symbols linked with him. The agitation centred around the temple, including the rath yatra of Advani, established Hindutva's claim to represent Hindus. The effort, however, goes on. Bhojshala in Madhya Pradesh and Baba Budangiri in Karnataka are the new sites invented to defend Hindu interests.
In order to realise this claim socially and culturally, the Sangh Parivar has adopted an aggressive policy of homogenising the diverse groups among Hindus. Many were taken by surprise when Dalits participated in the Gujarat pogrom or when Adivasis supported the Bharatiya Janata Party in the recently held elections to the State Assemblies. But it is not altogether surprising as the ideology of Hindutva has been at work among these groups for a long time in order to inculcate a Hindu identity in them. An indication of this change is the transformation in their worship pattern. Their traditional places of worship are being refashioned as Hindu temples and their modes of worship are being replaced by those of the Brahminical order. The Hinduisation thus taking place amounts to cultural denial and oppression. Yet, a large number of Dalits and Adivasis are attracted to the lure of sanskritisation, which is a major achievement of Hindu consolidation.
Appropriation of cultural tradition
A selective appropriation of cultural and intellectual traditions and their privileging through the intervention of innumerable organisations have lent credence to Hindutva's claim to represent Hindu interests. It is selective because it excludes those with non-Hindu affiliations. Even in the Hindu past only what is ideologically useful is invoked. The purpose of this appropriation is to inscribe on Hindutva the stamp of the authentic tradition of the nation. As a part of this endeavour, Hindu religious events have been turned into national cultural celebrations, even when they are alien to regional cultures or unknown to different sections of Hindus. Rakshabandhan and Ganapati festivals, for instance. Sponsored by the Sangh Parivar, they have now become public celebrations even in South India where they were earlier unknown.
The appropriation is not limited to cultural tradition alone; even political and intellectual leaders of the past are being turned into Hindu nationalist icons. Ancient and medieval rulers, even if they had followed the principles of secular governance, are claimed as Hindu. So are those who fought against colonial rule. Kerala Varma Pazhassi Raja, Velu Thampi, Nana Saheb and Kattabomman are being made into Hindutva's cult figures. Similarly, Hindu religious reformers of the 19th century, such as Dayananda Saraswati, Vivekananda and Aurobindo, who gave much importance to the universalist spirit in all religions, are celebrated as the progenitors of Hindu nationalism. But their ideas of inclusive nationalism are completely overlooked. Vivekananda, for instance, had argued that the union of Hindu and Islamic civilisations offered an ideal solution for India's regeneration. Aurobindo's concept of nationalism was riven with contradictions and at any rate he did not subscribe to a Hindu denominational nationalism in which the followers of other faiths had no place. Even Mahatma Gandhi and Bhagat Singh are in the process of being co-opted into the Hindutva fold!
At the same time, what is excluded from the nationalist tradition helps to reinforce Hindutva's religion-based concept of nationalism. Liberal and tolerant rulers such as Ashoka, Akbar, Jai Singh, Shahu Maharaj and Wajid Ali Shah do not figure in Hindutva's list of national heroes. Among those who revolted against the British, Bahadur Shah, Zinat Mahal, Maulavi Ahamadullah and General Bhakt Khan, are conspicuous by their absence. Even syncretic traditions such as the Bhakti movement are generally ignored. It is quite interesting that the advocates of religious universalism, including modernisers such as Rammohan Roy and Keshab Chandra Sen, do not figure in the Hindutva pantheon.
The selective appropriation is based on the premise that national regeneration and resurgence would require the recreation of an authentic culture by reclaiming the indigenous and purging the exogenous. Hindutva's cultural project, encoded in the slogan `nationalise and spiritualise', therefore, is twofold: First, to retrieve and disseminate the cultural traditions of the `golden' Hindu past; and second, to eliminate all accretions that had become part of the heritage. The educational policy as adumbrated by the BJP-led government is inspired by the first. The entire exercise of curriculum revision undertaken by government agencies during the last few years was mainly intended to achieve this end.
The involvement of the government, obsessive and lopsided, with the pursuit of Vedic knowledge is an obvious example. The government, it appears, is spending an enormous amount of money for research in Vedic studies, which in itself is not undesirable. But it is a different matter when undertaken to prove certain preconceived assumptions. It is reported that several science organisations funded by the government are scouting for scholars and institutions who would be willing to testify the golden age thesis. Such efforts are likely to create false notions about India's past.
The authentic cultural tradition Hindutva seeks to construct does not respect either the trajectory of its own historical evolution or the importance of external influences in its make-up. It, therefore, takes a static view of cultural tradition, ignoring its inherent dynamism. One of the consequences of this attitude is the intolerance of different interpretations and conflicting representations for which the Indian cultural tradition is justly famous. The plural cultural traditions, therefore, have been continuously under attack. Well-known examples are the vandalising of M.F. Hussain's paintings of Hindu goddesses, disruption of the shooting of Deepa Mehta's film, the campaign against the Malayalam writer Kamala Suraiya and the destruction of SAHMAT's exhibition on Ayodhya. The instances in which the Hindu cultural police has intervened, often in a violent and intimidatory manner, in defence of Hindu cultural tradition are far too many to cite. The denigration of secular historians, writers and journalists are also done with the same purpose.
These fairly orchestrated assaults are meant to silence any opposition to the communal colonisation of the cultural sphere. The legitimacy Hindutva has managed to garner is the most decisive development in contemporary Indian politics. A marginal force until about 10 years ago, it is now in a position to dictate the political and cultural agenda of the nation. Yet, the rise of Hindutva was neither sudden nor spontaneous. It owes much to the slow transformation in social consciousness as a result of sustained interventions in the cultural and religious life of the people. The decline of the Congress(I) and the inability of the Left to emerge as an alternative provided the space for Hinduva to imbue such interventions with a political content. It was compounded by the willing collaboration and cooperation of secular formations, particularly after the Emergency, which lent to Hindutva the legitimacy it lacked before. Hindutva thus succeeded in integrating politics with culture. Hence cultural nationalism is the real shining motif of Hindutva. Given its exclusivist character, however, cultural nationalism is anti-democratic and anti-national. The existence of India as a nation is possible only with the rejection of cultural nationalism.
K.N. Panikkar was formerly Vice-Chancellor of the Sri Sankara University of Sanskrit, Kalady, Kerala.
Source: countercurrents.org

Microcredit or Macrowelfare: The Myth of Grameen

For those who follow the zeitgeist — and the Nobel Prize committee seems always in the position of following rather than leading — the 2007 Peace Prize was no surprise. It went to one of the least-criticized men on the planet: Professor Muhammed Yunus and his Grameen Bank of Bangladesh.
Pundits left, right, and center appear to love him. His microcredit scheme seems to mix the best socialist ideals with free market means, and then the rhetoric alone carries the day.
The literature on Grameen is an echo chamber of hurrahs. Even the Nobel Committee didn't bother looking more deeply. Its press release provides 5 paragraphs of puff. Its link to other resources includes only one source: the Grameen Bank itself.
The uncritical attitude is especially strange given the extent to which pawn shops and payday lending — which, unlike Grameen, are genuine market institutions — in poor areas of the United States are hounded by the anticapitalist Left. Why is giving high-interest loans to the inner-city poor considered exploitative in the United States but wonderful and compassionate in Bangladesh?
The best fallout from the prize, then, will be a continued rethinking of the core assumptions behind microcredit of the Grameen model. A deeper look at this institution shows not a success but precisely the sort of flop you might expect from a government-subsidized program that is predicated on the view that money alone is the answer to poverty.
So let's look deeper. Aside from my own piece in 1995, the Grameen public relations edifice has been cracking for years. In 2001, the Wall Street Journal's Daniel Pearl and Michael Phillips revealed that the repayment rate of their loans isn't anywhere near what the bank claims, that at least one quarter of its loans were being used for consumption, that the bank delays defaults and hides problem loans, that the bank isn't subject to any kind of serious supervision, public or private. The government owns 6% of its assets, while the rest is only superficially owned by borrowers who cannot sell or trade their stock.
The impact on the target population has not been stellar. Sudhirendar Sharma of New Delhi writes that "the effect of the Grameen strategy has not been to reduce poverty but only to create a debt trap for borrowers, who are being charged very high rates of interest relative to conventional banks. The oft-repeated stories of how microcredit has helped a rural woman buy a buffalo, or how a poor woman now owns a telephone kiosk, cannot be replicated in meaningful numbers. Conversely, at the cost of the poor, a large number of NGOs have benefited; banks have found a convenient route to increased lendings; and corporations have got a growing consumer market to target."
Grameen is not alone in the microcredit movement. As pointed out by Jonathan Morduch in the Journal of Economic Literature (December 1999, pp. 1569-1614), "most programs continue to be subsidized directly through grants and indirectly through soft terms on loans from donors. Moreover, the programs that are breaking even financially are not those celebrated for serving the poorest clients. ...poverty-focused programs..cover only about 70 percent of their full costs."
Further, "even established programs like the Grameen Bank would have trouble making ends meet without ongoing subsidies." In answer to the question of whether Grameen is financially sustainable, the author says "no." If Grameen had been a market institution, it would have suffered $34 million in losses between 1985 and 1996, or it would have had to raise its loan rates to well above 50%.
As helpful as the data are, market logic alone is enough to reveal the problem. Consider the absurd claims that we are being asked to believe.
We are told that Yunus discovered a wonderful new way of making profitable loans to the poor by doing something that all conventional bankers in Bangladesh had overlooked. Half the population lives below the poverty line in Bangladesh. Are we really supposed to believe that banks blithely overlooked millions of poor people out of bias or hatred or snobbery?
Even if we can accept that he had some sort of entrepreneurial insight that no one else had, Grameen has been giving loans to poor women for thirty years. Are we really supposed to believe that conventional bankers were so stupid as not to spot this opportunity even after decades of demonstration? Yunus says that he discovered that the poor are "bankable" but if this were true in the way that he says, others would have discovered the same profit opportunities and done it without help from government.
Actually, Grameen is not really free enterprise at all. Yunus's first pile of cash came from the United Nations. Then he went to the Bangladesh government. Then he went to US foundations. In the 1980s and '90s, the bank received nearly $150 million in grants. At the same time, he started borrowing at low interest rates from governments around the world, and lending out the same money at higher rates. His institution keeps the difference.
Those who uncritically celebrate microcredit seem unaware of the actual debates within the microcredit community. As Connie Bruck explains, the dominant issue right now is how best to build institutions that are genuinely market viable as verses subsidy dependent. Until very recently and with only few exceptions, microbanking has been commerce in name only.
The Grameen Bank says it no longer accepts outright grants — the grant money goes to a dozen or so spin-off "enterprises" — but it still borrows low and sells high, and since its books are under wraps and its stockholders are that in name only, we'll never know for sure. But this much we do know from its recent history. The Grameen "foundation" received 1.5 million from Bill and Melinda Gates just a few months ago. Meanwhile, George Soros has given some $12 million plus to all sorts of Grameen spin-offs, including gifts to expand "banking" in other countries. (The latest detailed financial analysis, which looks grim, excludes these massive grants)
Since Yunus and Grameen won the prize, many institutions have rushed forward to take credit for the success, by virtue of their vast giving. Here is a small sample of other grant announcements: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.
Let us now turn to the peculiar features of Grameen, and, in particularly, its repayment tactics. The bank assembles peer groups to lean on delinquent borrowers, and makes political-mental reconstruction a condition of the loans, which are often being taken out to repay previous loans and so on. Yunus's "Sixteen Decisions" that must be adopted by all borrowers read like a party platform for collectivist regimentation.
"We shall take part in all social activities collectively."
"We shall grow vegetables all the year round. We shall eat plenty of them and sell the surplus."
"We shall build and use pit-latrines."
"If we come to know of any breach of discipline in any centre, we shall all go there and help restore discipline."
A very strange bank indeed!
And why would economists — and sophisticated free market economists, of all people (examples: 1, 2, 3, 4) — fall for the line that more debt can somehow save the world? More much sensible is Vijay Mahajan, the chief of Basix, who reports to the Guardian that Grameen's tactics suffer from five fatal assumptions.
First is the idea that poor should be self-employed rather than work for wages. That is contrary to the whole history of successful economic development.
Second is the idea that loans are the main financial service needed by the poor, whereas they really need savings and insurance.
Third is the idea that credit is what builds enterprise, whereas the truth is that entrepreneurship and management are more important.
Fourth is the idea that the non-poor don't need credit, whereas the truth is revealed in market-based banking: higher incomes can handle higher debt.
Fifth is the idea that microcredit institutions can become self-sustaining, whereas all experience shows that new enterprises in poor areas that are built on credit alone rarely emerge from dependency.
For years, I've received notes from financial professionals in Bangladesh that have thanked me for writing about this institution, which has made their lives very difficult.
But I thought it might be useful to share these recent additions to my pile of correspondence:
Your article on Grameen system is informative and thought provoking. I fully agree with you that the Grameen success stories are nothing but over blown claims supported by tricky financial arithmetic. As a Bangalee, I am delighted that Dr. Yunus won the Nobel peace prize. Any one should feel proud when another person of his country gets a Nobel. But I also reflect that now the whole Grameen operation will come under intense international scrutiny. I am sure that they will come to the same conclusions as you did.
Dr. Yunus founded so far 17 companies. Except for Grameen Phones, all flopped. How did he manage to fund these projects? Is it the Grameen Bank that funds his 'innovative ideas'. Perhaps we will never know, for Grameen Bank never publishes its audited annual balance sheets. Every other commercial banks in this country does that and it's mandatory. Grameen Bank does not pay any corporate tax which is about 20%. Other commercial banks have to pay the taxes.
Last year Grameen Phone made US$450 million profit (that's what I read in the newspaper). Out of these profit, TeleNor which owns 62% share took the profit and transferred it as US dollar. Who provided the hard currency? The poor Bangalee labourers who toil in Middle east like slaves. They send the dollars earned as their wage. These labourers, like the Grameen women are from deep rural areas where there is no electricity. In fact there are more than 70% households (mostly in the rural areas) where electricity is not available. How do these people use the mobile phone? They don't. Because they can not re-charge their mobile phone battery. Yet, Dr. Yunus is jetting around the world to tell that the Grameen phone has revolutionized the countryside. This is a massive fraudulent act involving millions of truly poor people who are incapable of getting beyond the razzle dazzle economic talk Dr. Yunus is making.
The western enthusiasm over Dr. Yunus verging on madness should now end. We should not be taken in by a fast talking economist whose life-long objective has been to be a player in the international arena. And he found out fast, that the all pervading poverty in this country could be used profitably to gain international attention and perhaps appreciation. … Whenever, I see this guy on the TV, I feel the presence of a very sleek salesman who target group is rich and powerful in the west who are apparently on a guilt trip over the poverty in third world countries.
The poverty problem in Bangladesh and many other countries are truly frightening and it has deep rooted causes. We should evaluate other models where a nation came out of poverty and fulfilled their basic human needs. …
And another concerning the Sixteen Decisions:
My daughter did an internship with Yunus/Grameen while she was doing her under graduate studies in the late 90's, and came back with both admiring and critical position on their works…. She did have some concerns as you also mention mainly in the pushy privacy violation aspects. As a gifted observer with US upbringing and heightened respect for the universally prevalent, taken-for-granted individual rights, it was hard for her to not notice the harsh big brotherism. She privately told me of some troubling aspects.

How real banks workThe real problem in Bangladesh is not its lack of personal indebtedness but instead is revealed in the account in the Index of Economic Freedom. Its government's bad economic policies include huge barriers to trade, vast amounts of state-owned enterprise, unionization, heavy taxes on foreign investment, a high tax burden, and some of the world's worst political violence and official corruption.
The irony of it all is that Bangladesh is making economic progress in its export sector for fish and clothing. There is no mention of Grameen's contribution to its 5% rate of economic growth in any reliable source.
The best that Professor Yunus could do to help his country would be to use his now-considerable credibility to push for a freer market through radical privatization and free trade. And it is true that he has pushed a bit for halfway privatization in health care. But in general, he has a stake in keeping the status quo just as it is. In the meantime, there is really no excuse for serious analysts of the Grameen experience to pretend as if money alone is going to save the country.
Courtesy:Jeffrey A. Tucker,Ludwig von Mises Institute

The Myth of Politics and Economics in India

There is buzz around town -- the recent economic polices of the UPA government, as announced via the Budget 2008, would lead them to electoral victory in Oct-Nov 2008. The Opposition is not really worried for at least two reasons. First, Budgets per se have little effect on elections; second, and more importantly, the reason for hidden complacency in the Opposition is because it has not one but at least two Trojan horses in the Congress camp!
There is an unfortunate myth about economic and political reality in India -- low inflation is an electoral winner. There is precious little evidence to substantiate this claim, and it is therefore unfortunate that even as good an economist as Dr Manmohan Singh keeps repeating this (false) mantra. Even more unfortunately, this mantra has led to misguided monetary policy in the mid 1990s, and today.
A major puzzle about the Indian economy is the constancy of the GDP growth rate post the economic reforms of the early 1990s (1991-93). These reforms have been politically popular; accepted by all parties, including most elected Left MPs.
Only post 2003 did the Indian economy experience a significant growth acceleration -- from 5.5 per cent (1980s and 1990s) to 8.5 per cent, 2003-2008. Congress leaders somewhat embarrassingly take refuge in long and variable lags, but such long lags only exist in virtual reality. So what really happened in the 1990s?
Why did the GDP growth rate not accelerate? It did, for three years 1993-94 to 1995-96 -- average GDP growth of 7.5 per cent. But "in the name of inflation" monetary sledgehammer made interest rates go sky high starting in 1995; investment declined subsequently, and GDP growth decelerated to a pre-reform level. One policy messed up the total effect of the mother of all reforms.
The political consequences of this strict monetarist (SM) policies were felt by the Congress in the 1996 elections. Except for 1991, inflation had been running at an 8 to 9 per cent rate. In the last year of Congress rule (1995-96), the inflation rate began to decline and reached a rate of 6.5 per cent in 1996-97, a rate close to then historical lows.
Despite this low-lowest inflation rate achievement, the Congress lost massively -- down from 220-odd seats before the elections to only 140 seats in 1996. Anyone for lower inflation getting you extra votes?
This extremist monetary policy is defended by the RBI, and its then governor, Dr Rangarajan (now the Chairman of the National Advisory Council to Manmohan Singh; the first Trojan horse). While electorally the Congress lost, India gained; inflation expectations got killed, and inflation was reduced permanently in India to an acceptable 3-5 per cent level.
How true is this belief? Quite false, actually. The table reports the identical pattern of Indian and developing economies' inflation rates; the other countries did not experience the Rangarajan SM sledgehammer. Yet inflation also collapsed elsewhere, and by somewhat more, 3 percentage points, compared to the 2.5 percentage point Indian decline.
The deeper one examines the inflation picture in India and the world, the less does the claim of extreme monetarist victory in India post 1996 hold true.

Sadly, history may be on the verge of repeating itself in 2008-09. Sadly for India that is, not necessarily for the political opposition. There has been an investment and savings boom in India, yet the present RBI governor, Dr Reddy (the second Trojan horse), believes that we have mostly been "overheating" these last few years.
And overheating begets inflation -- and inflation requires high interest rates. The RBI concern for inflation is touching, but in reality the RBI SM policy is geared towards the ideological belief that whenever the Indian economy grows faster than 6 to 7 per cent per annum, it most likely is overheating. This belief is logically and empirically inconsistent with the 14 percentage point jump in savings and investment rates that India has experienced over the last five years.
But what about gains against inflation? Again, the table shows that the RBI SM policy has produced a worse outcome than the average developing country. This average has stayed near constant for the last two years, as it has in India.
So no gains in inflation declines for India -- and losses in terms of much lower GDP growth. While China, Korea, Euroland and Australia have yet to slow down, Indian GDP growth has slowed considerably. From 9.6 to 8.5 per cent, and forecasts of 7 % GDP growth in 2008-09. Industrial growth is down considerably (data for Jan. 2008, at 5.6 per cent y-o-y growth, is half the growth observed in Jan. 2007).
Why this lower growth? Misguided inflation fighting has meant a large increase in real borrowing rates for corporates -- real rates of 10 per cent and above, while our competitors pay less than half this magnitude.
In the recent discussion about high food and energy inflation around the world, I have not understood the following. Agreed that food inflation hurts the poor the most and oil inflation hurts the middle class the most.
But can any of the so-called experts please tell me as to how raising interest rates in India to double-digit real levels is going to affect the probability of an Australian drought, which has driven food (wheat) prices to record levels? Or how does obstinate SM policy in India affect the prospects for the price of OPEC oil? These questions deserve answers rather than homilies about the need to fight inflation.
The more these questions are not asked and not answered, the greater the likelihood of an electoral defeat for the Congress in 2008, as it happened in 1996. Those who do not learn from history are condemned to repeat it. In the US, the Republicans are hoping for a Hillary Clinton win; in India, the Opposition is privately cheering Dr Rangarajan and Dr Reddy's strict monetarist tendencies.
Courtesy:Surjit S Bhalla,Business Standard,March 15,2008

The Economist On India

Well, here I am, hard at it trying to write a review for this blog of the latest Economist Intelligence Unit country risk report on India (which, worry not, will follow in due course) and what I find myself doing is revving-up on all cylinders to come back and point out some of the facts of this life to all those people who spent their time during the second half of 2006 arguing that India was overheating when it was busily growing away at a mere 8%. In fact India’s growth has not only continued, it has even accelerated slightly since the debate got started, growing at an 8.9% year-on-year rate during the most recent quarter (following 9.1% and 9.3% in the first and second quarters of calendar 2007, respectively). And far from inflation shooting up and away through the roof it is currently not too far from the Reserve Bank of India’s 5% target. Perhaps it is towards China or Russia that people should be directing their attention, or towards Eastern Europe, or even - god forbid - the eurozone, but India it seems is one country where the “great overheating” argument is steadily running out of steam. Of course there is one country which everyone will readily admit is not overheating, and in comparison with the rate of negative price increases they have on their hands in Japan India’s inflation may seem serious, but I think we can safely leave that topic on one side for today.At this point I just want to repost part of a reply I gave to the Economist when they had the kindness to try to answer some points I had raised about the general quality of their economic coverage, and in particular about what I take to be their obsession with ignoring the demographic component in economic growth. For the Economist, it seems, growth and development is a single issue item, and is all about insitutions, and institutional quality. Which makes it kind of funny that Argentina, which must be among the worst of the emerging economy pack in institutional quality is still powering away, despite more or less openly manipulating their inflation data.
Obviously institutions matter, but so does demography. This is not a one horse race, or if you prefer, this particular horse doesn’t only run on one leg.
The topic in question here is India’s potential growth rate. Recent GDP performance at just under 9% must have been astounding many of India’s critics, especially given the way inflation, despite all that growth, has been kept pretty much under control.

Doesn’t look to bad at all, does it, in the light of what has been happening during the second half of this year. And remember this was written in the Autumn of 2006, not Autumn 2007 when just about everyone and their auntie is saying something like this. Of course this whole debate is ongoing.Again, I am really comfortable standing by this, and even the point about China, since the inflation problem really does seem now to be getting a grip there, in a way which it isn’t doing in India (and remember they have had nearly 30 years now of the one child per family policy, and at some point soon their labour market is going to tighten and tighten, and for a glimpse of what may well happen next in China see my recent analysis of the growing problem we now see in Russia: “Russian Inflation, Too Much Money Chasing Too Few People” (not too much danger of this getting to be a problem in India in the near future, now is there?).
Since this time of course, the whole recoupling/decoupling issue has really taken off as a live debate. My latest thoughts on this can be found here, and Claus Vistesen’s post - The Global Economy, Compass and Charts Needed - follows up on and continues the “uncharted waters” theme.

To The Economist
At the risk of having to assume some kind of modern “j’accuse” mantle (for which of course there are ample precedents in the early origins of your own magazine) I am going to put up yet another comment. Maybe this is because I would like to participate in that “severe contest between intelligence, which presses forward, and an unworthy, timid ignorance obstructing our progress” which your contents page so boldly announces.
Maybe it is also because I want to pin down quite clearly for future reference just what the issues are, and just why it isn’t “absurd” to suggest that the Economist currently systematically fails to factor-in the demographic components in economic growth (or the lack of it). Well, saving the best (or should that be the worst) to the last, I would like now to come to the case of your India correspondent. This gentleman (and I sincerely hope that despite his evident predilection for strong Vindaloo curry he is one of these) has been systematically re-adjusting upwards India’s potential trend growth rate in recent months. In fact his estimate seems to have shot up from 6.5% in November 2006 to 7% in February 2007, to 8% in June 2007. Now that’s an upward adjustment of around 25% in trend growth in roughly 8 months. Quite an achievement, especially since he offers absolutely no explanation whatever for these adjustments, but what he does not fail to tell us - oh, he never lets a moment rest without beating this drum - is that: “India’s economy, like Delhi this week (or Vindaloo curry perhaps, EH), remains far too hot.”
Now just in case what I am suggesting here is questioned I would like to quote chapter and verse, since the issue is an important one.
In November 2006 the Economist’s India correspondent estimated capacited growth for India at around 6.5%.

Basically I find myself in agreement with the Indian economists he doesn’t like. It isn’t that these reforms aren’t desireable, as he admits, we all agree on this. But the point is, even ex-reforms (and of course there have been reforms and global opening) demographic momentum would indicate that substantial growth is now going to occur. How substantial? Hard to say, but I think it is quite probable that 5 years from now India will be growing faster than China, and may even peak out at the highest annual growth rates yet seen for a significant economy over the 5 to 10 year window. I can justify why I think this with some sort of coherent argument, but I think the big danger for the sort of view they are advancing at the Economist is that they imagine virtually nothing is possible without institutional reform, and this is just as big a mistake as saying demography is everything. You need to systematically take the two components into account. If you don’t do this you risk getting into the ridiculous position the World Bank found itself in earlier in the year, when countries like Argentina and Thailand complained that since their countries were registered as going backwards on the global governance index, while both countries were growing quite nicely, then logically the methodology used to construct the index must be wrong. IMHO the World Bank has been totally mechanistic about institutions and thoroughly deserves all the problems it creates for itself on this count. OK, so that’s it. I finally rest my case. The dialogue will continue.

Source:The Indian Economy Blog

A Very Special PoliceIndia's 'Special Cell' and Abuses

Nirmalangshu Mukherji [Published earlier on ZNet Activism,June 29, 2005]

Keeping to the subcategory that Noam Chomsky calls "doctrinally acceptable," (1)óótheir terror against usóóthe real threat of terrorism in India cannot be denied. While preventive measures, which conform to principles of democratic governance, are needed to combat this threat, any exaggerated perception of the threat, and the resulting fear, is likely to affect the roots of such governance itself.(2) Allowed to grow, the combination of fear and helplessness may promote both a loss of confidence in open, democratic procedures, and an increased dependence on the peremptory features that any state has. The spiraling cycle of distrust, violence and loss of democracy only helps the terrorist. It is now acknowledged that "human rights, along with democracy and social justice, are one of the best prophylactics against terrorism."(3) From this perspective, recent developments on the terrorism-frontóóespecially, its handling by law-enforcing agenciesóóraise worrying questions about the functioning of civil institutions in India. Going by newspaper reports in the past four months, the national capital of India must be one of the most dangerous places on this planet. Apart from big-time extortionists, hired killers, gangsters, and highway robbers, the city of Delhi seems to be teeming with militants from a variety of terrorist organizationsóóall armed to the teeth with sophiscated weapons and explosives, and flushed with astronomical funds. The panic is so extreme that, when an explosion due to gas-leak took place in a Delhi Metro site, television channels rushed in. As the news was aired, "within an hour, we received over 500 calls where harried people inquired about the explosion," according to the Delhi Police. (Hindu, 6 March).The reports also suggest that, despite the presence of this terror, sustained bloodbath and mayhem could be mostly averted in time due to impressive police work by a small group of brave men belonging to the Special Cell of the Delhi Police. The following reports, collected basically from one respectable newspaper (The Hindu), bring out the picture. We give a brief description only of the 'terrorism'-related incidents. (A much longer version with more details is available on request)Factsheet Special Cell(1) February 18, 2005: Ex-Supreme Commander of Al-jehad arrested Aziz, ex-militant, "chairman of the Jammu and Kashmir People's League," arrested. Fake Indian currency worth Rs. 1 lakh, and UAE dirhams worth Rs. 16 lakhs "obtained" from the Pakistan High Commission, seized. (Hindu, 19 Feb)(2) February 25, 2005: Two Kashmiri ex-militant 'activists' arrestedSouth-West Delhi police arrested ex-militant, "self-proclaimed human rights activist" Mohammad Ahsan Untoo on February 12. Rs. 70, 000 in cash, allegedly received from the Pakistan High Commission in exchange for defence information, seized. At Untoo's "instance," Gulam Nabi Nazar, had been arrested from Srinagar on February 17. Special Cell, among other agencies, interrogated the arrested persons. (Hindu, 26 & 28 Feb)(3) March 2, 2005: Kidnappers of notorious gang arrested(4) March 3, 2005: Extortionist and aide of Chhota Shakeel arrested(5) March 5, 2005: Three militants gunned down, two arrestedHamid Hussain and Sariq, "functioning as LeT operatives," arrested. 10.5 kg of RDX seized. At their instance, a Special Cell team led by Additional Commisioner of Police, Rajbir Singh, "laid siege" to a house in Bharat Vihar in South-West Delhi, and gunned down three LeT militants. Gelatine sticks weighing 100 kg., 450 detonators, three AK-56 assault rifles, four hand grenades, live cartridges, satellite and mobile phones and some documents seized.(Hindu, 6 & 7 March).(6) March 6, 2005: Pakistani conspiracy to destabilize economy foiledLeT militants were planning to attack the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun, and IT companies in Bangalore "in a bid to destabilize the country's booming economy fuelled by the IT sector." Hamid disclosed that one Salim who took him to Kathmandu to meet Abdul Aziz, "a senior Lashkar functionary." Abdul Aziz works under the command of Saifullah, who operates mainly from Saudi Arabia." "Irrefutable evidence"óópassport, ID card, diaries, etc.óófound to show militants were " Pakistani nationals." (Hindu, 7 March)(7) March 7, 2005: Widespread terror network exposedOne slain Pakistani militant, Shahnawaz, obtained driving licenses from Aligarh and Patna. "Intelligence agencies" listed terrorist outfits spread over Nepal, Jedda, Jakarta, Bangladesh, Kapilvastu, Kashmir, Purnea, Champaran, Darbhanga, Saharsa, Malda, Murshidabad, and so on. (Hindu, 8 March)(8) March 8, 2005: Arrest of LeT "conduit", more revelations21-year old LeT conduit, Mohammad Iftekar Ahsan Mallick, arrested; he revealed that the third slain militant, Shams, was an activist of SIMI. A hunt was initiated for Salim, "aka doctor," who is the link between Hamid and Abdul Aziz (see (6) above). (Hindu, 9 March)(9) March 10, 2005: Criminal gunned down, Pak spy arrested, profile of Salim42-year old Pakistani national Mohammad Sayeed arrested. "Incrimating documents" recovered. Sayeed was instructed by one Major Taimoor of the "Pakistani intelligence agencies" to receive a set of documents from a person near Jama Masjid. (Hindu, 11 March) The Cell also released a photograph of Salim, alias "doctor." (10) April 4, 2005: Robbers, extortionists arrested(11) April 12, 2005: Contract killers, highway robbers arrested(12) April 25, 2005: Two Lashkar militants gunned downA team of Special Cell, led by Rajbir Singh, intercepted a white Maruti car near the gate of the National Science Center in the Pragati Maidan area in New Delhi. When the two occupants came out of the car and opened fire; the police returned the fire and killed the militants. 2 kg of RDX, an AK-56 assault rifle, a .3 mm pistol, two magazines, four detonators, a satellite phone, two timers, alongwith ID cards and e-mail addresses were recovered. "Intelligence inputs" gave their names as Osama and Sabir, both belonging to Sialkot in Pakistan. (Hindu, 26 April)(13) April 26, 2005: Hunt for more terroristsDiary recovered from Osama contained satellite phone numbers of Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir. Scrutiny of the calls made and received by the terrorists indicated that they were in constant touch with "top commanders of the LeT," Abul Alqama, based in Jammu and Kashmir. More members of the "module" could be hiding in the capital. (Hindu, 27 April; Times, 27 April)(14) April 27, 2005: Gangster gunned down(15) May 15, 2005: One gangster killed, several arrested(16) May 16, 2005: LeT Militant arrestedOn 12 May, ACP Rajbir Singh arrested a LeT militant, Harun Rashid, ay as he arrived at the Delhi airport from Singapore. Rashid is an "active member" of SIMI. He was in touch with "doctor" Salim, Abdul Aziz in Kathmandu, Shams, Shahnawaz, and Hamid (see 6 and 8). (Hindu, 17 May)(17) May 19, 2005: Two hard-core criminals arrested(18) May 21, 2005: Three criminals gunned down(19) May 22, 2005: Blasts in Delhi cinema hallsThe blasts resulted in one death and several dozen injured. Although the case was "handed over" to the Special Cell the same night (Hindu, 23 May), a number of other agencies ó the Inter-State Cell of the Crime Branch, The Intelligence Bureau and the Central Bureau of Investigation ó also seem to be conducting the investigations. (Hindu, 1 & 10 June; Times, 2 June) It is unclear how the responsibilities (and laurels) are to be distributed among them. The stellar role of ACP Rajbir Singh in arresting terrorists from Punjab was repeatedly highlighted in the reports. (Times, 6 June)(20) May 23, 2005: LeT militant arrestedLeT militant, Ishaq, arrested; 5.5 kgs of RDX, 2 detonators, and Rs. 2.5 lakhs seized. (Times, 24 May) (21) June 4, 2005: Three Hizb militants arrested Two agents of the Hizb-e-Islami, Ejaj Ahmed Wani and Shabbir Ahmed Peer, arrested on May 28; fake currency notes worth Rs.1.1 lakh seized. Subsequently, another LeT operative Nazir Ahmed Khan was arrested by the Special Cell and half a kg of RDX was recovered. (Hindu, 5 June) Nazir had also received Rs. 60 lakhs through hawala channels arranged by Sarfaraz for further delivery. (Times, 5 June)Unanswered QuestionsA. What explains the sudden exponential increase of terrorist activities in and around the city of Delhi during the specified period, especially when it was well-known that the city was placed under close police surveillance after the attack on S.A.R. Geelani (see below)?B. What explains that organizations such as LeT would allow themselves to be repeatedly caught in the traps set up by the Cell? Consider the arrest of Harun Rashid, on 12 May. The LeT 'module' he is supposed to be a member of was decisively 'smashed' by the Cell in a series of operations between March 5-10. Yet, Rashid compulsively landed at the Delhi Airport with the Special Cell waiting for him. C. What explains that the Cell is able to recover huge amounts of explosives, weapons, incriminating material, IDs, diaries, phone numbers, e-mail messages, cash, etc. such that the identity and the goals of the organizations are immediately exposed?D. What explains the remarkable ability of the Special Cell to remain unharmed? As documented, considerable arms and ammunition were recovered during most of the operations. We also saw that in many cases, allegedly seasoned terrorists/ gangsters were arrested or killed after gun battles. However, we could locate just one instance in which two members of the Special Cell received 'minor injuries,' and that too in a shoot-out with gangsters in Hardwar; in Delhi, there's not even a scratch. Even in Jammu and Kashmir, where we would expect the security forces to be better trained, more experienced, well-equipped and informed, a large number of security forces were killed in anti-terrorist operations during the same period. (Times, 12 June)Protest by Human Rights GroupsThere were at least two reports of protests by human rights groups on some of the incidents listed above.Arrest of Mohammad Ahsan Untoo (See case 2 above)As noted, the police reported the arrest of an ex-Hizb militant Mohammad Ahsan Untoo on February 12. Newspapers reported the arrests with the following headings: 'Former Hizb unit head and assistant arrested' (Asian Age), 'Two held for allegedly passing defence documents' (The Hindu), 'Ultra, Pak agent held for spying' (The Pioneer), 'ISI agent received donations from Pak High Commission' (Times of India), etc.On 16 May 2005, the All India Defence Committee for SAR Geelani and All Jammu & Kashmir Trade Union Centre held a press conference in Delhi on the Untoo case (see case 2). In their press statement, the Centre affirmed that Untoo is in fact a well-known human rights activist and is the Chairman of the Human Rights Forum, Jammu and Kashmir, and a member of the UK based International Forum for Justice. He has taken up over 3000 cases with the State Human Rights Commission, National Human Rights Commission, and Amnesty International among others.In an application filed before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, on 12 May 2005, the advocate for Untoo, the noted human rights lawyer, N. D. Pancholi, submitted that: (i) Untoo came to Delhi on 5 February, 2005 for some personal work.(4) and to file some cases with the NHRC; (ii) after learning of the attack on Geelani on 8 February, he went to the All India Institute of Medical Sciences the next day to show solidarity as a human rights activist, but the police did not allow him to see Geelani; (iii) the same evening, some unidentified policemen arrested him from Priya Guest House in Daryagunj; (iv) he was kept in police custody and was brutally tortured for the next ten to twelve days; (v) the police compelled one scavenger to sodomize him and subjected him to all kinds of humiliation; (vi) the police wanted Untoo to make a false confession stating that he was involved in the attempt to murder Geelani; (vii) the police forced Untoo to sign blank pieces of paper; (viii) he was produced before a Magistrate only on 13 February; (ix) he was denied access to any lawyer; (x) there were reports in the papers that Untoo had been arrested in connection with the attack on Geelani; (xi) Untoo is a victim of communalism and prejudice against Kashmiris who have been portrayed as "terrorists."The Pragati Maidan Encounter (See case 14 above)A team of People's Union for Democratic Rights, PUDR, visited the site of the shooting, examined the car in which the alleged militants were travelling, and questioned the guards at the National Science Center who were present during the operation. PUDR made three observations, among others. (Hindu, 3 May)First, since a large number of policemen, were already stationed in and around the area much before the time of the encounter; it was highly unlikely that the alleged terrorists would have failed to notice the arrangement and stopped the. Second, bullet holes on the car's body suggest that the persons were fired at close range. Third, the guards did not see any cars parked there for any length of time, or a car being chased. The PUDR also pointed out that "the police are never hurt in the cross-fire even when they are wearing only civilian clothes and the encounters always take place in high-profile places like Ansal Plaza, Humayun's Tomb or Pragati Maidan." PUDR requested the National Human Rights Commission to investigate the matterIn a seminal piece published in The Guardian (5 July, 2003), Basharat Peer began a recounting of the Ansal Plaza 'encounter' with a quick portrayal of Rajbir Singh, the ACP of the Special Cell, who led the police operation on the concerned occasions: "A tall, sturdy man with rugged features, Singh has risen from the lowly position of sub-inspector to his present prestigious position in just a few years. His record of eliminating terrorists is matched only by the allegations of human rights violations against him. His role in six separate killings of alleged terrorists and gangsters has been questioned by the Indian media, and his involvement in a shoot-out at a shopping mall by the National Human Rights Commission of India." In November 2002, Singh and his men claimed to have killed two terrorists of Lashkar-e-Taiba at Ansal Plaza shopping mall, but "a local Hindu doctor, Hari Krishna, told the media that he saw the police shoot in cold blood the two unarmed and apparently drugged men, who, Krishna said, could barely walk." In the 30-odd months that have elapsed, both Hari Krishna and the Ansal Plaza incident have disappeared from public view. How many of the alleged arrests, encounters and recoveries detailed earlier are fake? And why were they needed now?A Perspective: December 13Much of the concerns about possible false cases and fake encounters can be traced back to some of the salient features of the Parliament attack case. The hearing on this case has just ended at the Supreme Court of India, and the Court has reserved its judgment.(5) In what follows, we will just cite some reports and documents that are currently before the Court, without commenting on their veracity. The Cell and December 13To recall, five armed persons entered the Parliament complex in New Delhi on 13 December 2001 at about 11.30 A.M. when Parliament was in session. On being challenged near the carcade of the Vice-President of India, they opened fire. For half an hour, a fierce battle raged outside the building. All five persons died on the spot before they could enter inside the Parliament building. Nine other people, including some members of the security forces, died in the attack while sixteen persons from the security forces were injured. Soon after the attack, four people were arrested by the Special Cell for their alleged role in the conspiracy: Mohammad Afzal, Shaukat Hussain Guru, Syed Abdul Rehman Geelani, and Afsan Guru. The case went on trial in the designated POTA Court in May 2002. The Court delivered its judgment in December 2002. On appeal, the case went to the High Court in Delhi, which delivered its judgment on 29 October 2003. On cross-appeal, the case went to the Supreme Court where the hearing has just ended, as noted.Throughout the trial, the defence raised a series of objections against the conduct of the investigations by the police. Some of these were reported in the press even before the judgment of the POTA Court.(6) During the High Court stage, the defence was joined by seniors lawyers Ram Jethmalani and Shanti Bhushan, both former Union minister of law. Commenting on the investigation, Jethmalani submitted that it "is riddled with illegality. The evidence discloses concoction and fabrication. All these have been grossed one and have resulted in a grave miscarriage of justice."(7) In his submission on behalf of Shaukat Hussain Guru, Shanti Bhushan contended that his client "has been falsely implicated in the conspiracy case by the investigating agency." The agency has not only "gone out of its way in concocting evidence," it "had even gone to the extent of forging and fabricating important documents for framing the appellants and police officials had clearly given perjured evidence." According to the Senior Counsel, "the investigating officials have clearly committed offences punishable imprisonment with life under Section 194 and 195 of I.P.C." "When such a serious offence has been committed by the investigating officials," Shanti Bhusan continued, "it is only by having them punished that such fabrication of documents and the giving of perjured evidence can be stopped by the Court."(8)The High Court not only acquitted Geelanióósentenced to death by the POTA Courtóóand Afsan Guru of all charges, they made several adverse remarks on the conduct of the police. First, concerning Mohammad Afzal's 'confession' before the media conducted by Rajbir Singh, the court observed: "It has indeed become a disturbing feature as is being noticed by us repeatedly that the accused persons, after their remand by the Magistrate, are brazenly paraded before the press and interviews are being allowed."(9) Moreover, the Court observed that "the prosecution stands discredited qua the time of arrest of accused S. A. R. Geelani and accused Afsan Guru." In particular, they noted that "The presence of Bismillah's [Geelani's brother] signatures as having attested the arrest memos of the three accused probabilises the testimony of DW-5 that Bismillah was in illegal confinement and was forced to sign papers."(10) However, the Court stopped short of suggesting punishment for the concerned police officers.The outright acquittal of Geelani and Afsan from all charges naturally gave rise to some obvious questions. Why should we now believe in the prosecution's story for the rest of the case? In particular, what justifies the underlying assumption that, although the police, the prosecution and the POTA Court have been horribly wrong in one part of the case, they have been vindicated for the other parts? Some publications began to appear that examined these and related questions with full seriousness.(11) As the trial moved to the Supreme Court, these write-ups penetrated much of the readership in the activist and human rights circles. Briefly, they raised the following issues, among others: (i) there was a complicity between the media and the police for projecting a largely unproven story, (ii) the police possibly forced statements and confessions from the accused, (iii) public witnesses were coerced into making false statements, (iv) the accused were brutally tortured by the police, (v) crucial documents and records were fabricated or tampered with, (vi) the accused, especially Mohd. Afzal, a surrendered militant, did not get adequate legal representation.(12) In a recent interview, Shanti Bhusan complained that the government "pushed us to the brink of a nuclear war" following the attack on Parliament. However, "the police failed to crack the case" as "all the five militants died in the attack." So the police, Shanti Bhusan suggested, "framed people" in order "to create a conspiracy case." (Tehelka, 16 Oct, 2004) Outside the courts, these concerns were largely restricted to the activist and human rights circles, as noted.The Attack on SAR GeelaniThe noted concerns exploded into the full public domain with the murderous attack on SAR Geelani on the evening of 8 February 2005. As the grievously-injured Geelani was rushed to the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, a large number of lawyers, activists, journalists and university teachers gathered in front of the hospital within the hour. In front of live television, speaker after speakeróófrom the eminent lawyer Kamini Jaiswal to student leaders from the Jawaharlal Nehru Universityóópointed their finger at the Special Cell.In the following days, the entire mainstream media highlighted the allegations against the Special Cell for the first time in the brief history of the Parliament attack case.(13) The day after the attack, hundreds of writers, artists, academicians, activists, and journalists gathered in front of the Police Headquarters in a spontaneous demonstration that lasted for hours. A delegation was formed and sent to meet the Union Home Minister, Shri Shivraj Patil, to submit an 'Open letter' that was signed by hundreds of those gathered. The letter stated: "although we do not wish to pre-judge any specific complicity in the attack on Geelani at this stage, we strongly feel that the involvement of the Delhi Police itself, especially its Special Branch, in the crime can not be ruled out." The letter then went on to describe the treatment meted out to Geelani and the other accused in the Parliament attack case; it also detailed Geelani's refusal to submit to police pressures despite torture. Further, it described how "after his acquittal, Geelani has been a prominent voice in defence of democracy and human rights. Following his own bitter experience, he has drawn attention of the country to the abject violation of the rights of prisoners, especially Kashmiri muslims, in the Tihar jail." Thus, the letter suggested, "no wonder his presence has been a thorn in the flesh of cynical power enjoyed by the Special Branch with the undisguised blessings of the erstwhile NDA government in the name of anti-terrorist operations."(14)Recounting some of the more sinister aspects of the Parliament attack case, Arundhati Roy wrote, "I have no idea who pumped those bullets into S.A.R. Geelani. However, in deference to the general public unease with the Special Cell, the investigation ought to be conducted by an agency other than the Delhi Police. While it may be unfair to accuse them without evidence, they certainly cannot be considered above suspicion, and must be investigated."(15) In a subsequent article, we observed that there is no report as to whether the police have interrogated their own brethren in the Special Branch, the hoodlums that ransacked Senior Counsel Ram Jethmalani's office when he decided to defend Geelani in the High Court, and the right-wing forces that burst crackers in front of the Special Court when Geelani was sentenced to death. In other words, people with demonstrated enmity towards Geelani have been systematically spared. At the same time, there is a constant attempt to implicate shadowy terrorist groups, persons lodged in prison, and even Geelani himself for "crafting" this attack.(16)Questioning the investigative methods of the Delhi Police on the attack on Geelani, the Delhi University Teachers In Defence of SAR Geelani submitted a petition to the National Human Rights Commission on 15 February. This petition was signed by a large number of academicians, lawyers, and human rights activists. After a careful review of the police investigations, the petition stated "these actions not only show the failure of the police to launch a serious investigation into this massive crime, there is an attempt to personalize what is clearly an enormous political crime. Who are the police trying to shield with these diversionary tactics?"(17) As noted, these concerns were openly expressed and covered in the mainstream papers and television for several days after the attack. The matter was placed before the Supreme Court who asked for a report from the police. (Hindu, 10 Feb) Also the defence filed an application, with supporting documents, before the Court praying for transfer of the case to the CBI. Although, the Court rightly refused to join the issue given the pending Parliament attack case, they suggested that the petitioners appeal before the High Court in Delhi.We must also mention the publication of the book December 13: Terror over Democracy, with a foreword essay by Noam Chomsky, in March 2005. The book recounts the allegations of fabrication, concoction and conspiracy by the police in detail with supporting documents. Simultaneously, a national Committee for Inquiry into December 13 was launched. The committee is chaired by the veteran Gandhian and Rajya Sabha member Nirmala Deshpande and has Mahasweta Devi, Rajni Kothari, Prabhat Patnaik, Ashish Nandy, Prashant Bhushan, Mihir Desai, Gautam Navlakha, Sumanta Bannerjee, among others, as members. One of the first actions of the Committee was to send copies of the book to the highest political and judicial leadership of the country. Quite evidently, for the first time in recent years, the heat is on the police, especially the Special Cell. It is also natural to assume that, especially in view of recent developments, the Supreme Court will pay the closest attention to the conduct of the police in the Parliament attack case.From this perspective, it is difficult to ignore a telling pattern in the operations of the Special force listed above. The first sequence of aggressive media publicity of the anti-terrorist operations of the Special Cell begins a week after the attack on Geelani, when the public outcry on the attack was at its peak. The sequence lasts nearly a month and reaches a crescendo with the gunning down of three alleged LeT militants in Bharat Vihar. After this huge success, a period of lull followed as public protests died out. However, the Cell was never out of news: it turned its attention to gangsters. The second sequence begins in the third week of April, the week of final hearings at the Supreme Court as the Court prepares to write the judgment. This sequence begins with the high drama at Pragati Maidan and continues today with a careful mix of operations against both gangsters and terrorists. How can the general public and the Court ignore the supreme efficiency and the indispensability of the Cell in making the life of the citizens of Delhi safe?In a way, the police spilled the beans when, in response to a question about allegations of illegal arrest and police brutality by rights activists in the Untoo case, a senior police officer said, "This is a desperate attempt by them as the Supreme Court is going to pronounce judgment in the case soon." (Indian Express, 17 May) The questioner did not even mention either the Supreme Court or the Parliament attack case.

Full text of the petition at www.sacw.net/hrights/letterNHRC14022005.htmlNirmalangshu Mukherji is a Professor of Philosophy, Delhi University, India. E-mail address: somanshu@bol.net.in

The Article About Nothing

Hmmm, no ideas? So what? Ever thought of writing about….nothing? You know this is actually common nowadays. Free ArticlesI don’t know how you feel but I am overwhelmed about the abundance of information that can be found everywhere.Everyone is writing about everything. The same subjects are written and rewritten and rewritten and I look and them and wonder how the hell is this supposed to help the modern man become more efficient? The truth is that we are in a hurry, our whole lives are spent running from place to place, trying to keep up with the others around us. We sleep less trying to make more time for ourselves, but we end up wasting that time on useless things. How about TV ? How useless is that? I really think that you are in the danger of becoming dumber if you spend too much time in front of it. There are people that spend half of the day, that becomes half of their life in front of the TV. You know what the worst part is ? Most shows on TV are for complete morons … instead of watching someone live a stupid life on TV maybe you should go outside and live your own life…maybe you’ll start liking it.Internet….oh this is a big one. At first I thought wow, what a useful thing, and don’t get me wrong, if you know what you’re looking for and how to find it, you’ll probably find it on the internet. The sad thing is, that besides information, it is full to the teeth with crap. People selling made-up information, spammers, people trying to scam other people. How in gods name is it possible to search for something and the first 10 or so results you find are scams? Let me tell you why…because these guys know SEO, they will do anything to be listed first in search engines to make more money. Instead, the good old sites that offer information and recreation aren’t well placed in search engines because they don’t do SEO, they just rely on offering good content .This is not good, I’m at paragraph 5 and I still have nothing to write about…this is turning out to be just another useless piece of article, made just to confuse the common man. Another article in the immensity of useless articles that just take up space and help no one. Hope you didn’t reach this point and I’m really sorry for wasting your time in this manner, you know the other day I read something I found really enlightening. It said something like this : “If you stay and do nothing, you don’t kill time, you commit suicide”.At least let me give you an advice I hope you’ll take, because it’s for your own good. Stop wasting time and do something with your life. Never say I’ll do this tomorrow, if you have time, do it now, and live to the maximum ! Have a nice life !
Source: Taitelul Verde, http://www.articleset.com